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The Need for Liberalization of Barriers to Trade in
Insurance to Promote Consumer Interests: Analysis
of the Brazilian Reinsurance System as a Case Study
Christopher R. Rabley'
Insurance is a particularly sensitive area from the point of view
of the protection of the consumer.'
-Court of Justice of the European Communities
I. Introduction
On December 13, 1997, two hours past the midnight deadline,
trade negotiators at the World Trade Organization (WTO)2
I B.A.A. 1989, University of Florida; J.D. 1999, University of Miami School of
Law. Mr. Rabley is a former Assistant Vice President, Global Services Group, J&H
Marsh & McLennan, New York, New York and former Assistant Vice President and
Manager of the International Department for J&H Marsh McLennan, Miami, Florida.
The author would like to thank Professor Edgardo Rotman of the University of
Miami School of Law for his assistance and comments in the preparation of this article.
Special thanks to Jennifer Rabley for her support and encouragement and the staff of the
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation for their hard
work and editorial assistance.
I Case 205/84, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1986 E.C.R. 3783
(1986), quoted in Werner Pfenningstorf, Public Law of Insurance, in IX INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 7, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND
INSTITUTIONS 16 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1991).
2 The Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
established the World Trade Organization. See generally General Agreement on Trade
in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO], Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994). The WTO has three basic
responsibilities: to demonstrate the rigorous, objective, and expedient enforcement of
the world trade obligations; to reinforce support for global trade liberalization; and to
administer new Uruguay Round Accords and monitor compliance by WTO signatories.
See JEFFREY J. SCHOTr, WTO 2000: SETTING THE COURSE FOR WORLD TRADE 5 (1996).
Through its dispute settlement mechanism, the WTO can measure the conformity of
country practices with the rights and obligations made through the WTO, but member
countries are responsible for compliance. See id. at 4. WTO members have an
obligation under international law to comply with WTO rules, but the WTO has no
means to force countries to honor such obligations. See id. For recent results of the
WTO, see International Institute for Sustainable Development, WTO Ministerial
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finalized the first meaningful pact in trade in financial services.3
The pact succeeded in lowering barriers to foreign suppliers of
financial services in 70 countries and locked the commitments of
102 nations into binding WTO rules that are subject to dispute
settlement procedures.4
The United States and other industrial nations considered the
1997 WTO Financial Services Agreement (FSA or Agreement),
which arose out of the 1995 WTO Financial Services Accord
(1995 Accord), a major success. The Agreement represented a
"decades-long effort" by developed nations to liberalize barriers to
trade in financial services in developing nations.6 The FSA
commitments covered an astonishing $17.8 trillion in global
securities assets, $2.2 trillion in worldwide insurance premiums,
and $38 billion in bank lending.7 The offers by developing
countries in the insurance sector, however, made the Agreement a
8
success.
Insurance and reinsurance companies are no longer defined by
geographic region.9 Major insurers, fueled by competition for
Conference, 3 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTS 6 (Dec. 16, 1996) <http:\\www.iisd.ca
flinkages>.
3 See Frances Williams & Guy de Jonquieres, WTO Pact Will Open Financial
Services Sector, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1997, at 1.
4 See id.
5 See Bhushan Bahree & Helene Cooper, Landmark Deal: WTO Finance Pact
Seen as Boon for U.S., Europe, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1. Commenting on
the WTO agreement in trade in financial services, U.S. Trade Representative Charlene
Barshefsky stated: "[T]his is the biggest trade deal the United States will ever do
because there's no sector in the U.S. economy that will ever come close to approaching
the financial-services sector." Id. James A. Leach (R-Iowa), Chairman of the House
Banking and Financial Service Committee, commented: "From an American
perspective, the agreement could not be better timed. Our private-sector financial
houses have never been in better shape to compete in world markets." Helen R.
MacLeod, Insurance Industry Heaps Praise on Global Financial Services Pact, J. COM.,
Dec. 19, 1997, at 5A [hereinafter Insurance Industry Heaps Praise].
6 Insurance Industry Heaps Praise, supra note 5. See generally Terence G. Berg,
Trade in Services: Toward a "Development Round" of GATT Negotiations Benefiting
Both Developing and Industrialized States, 28 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-2 (1987)
(discussing attempts to include the subject of trade in services in GATT negotiations).
7 See Bahree & Cooper, supra note 5.
8 See id.
9 See Guy Carpenter Releases Global Reinsurance Analysis Study for 1997, PR
NEWSWIRE, Dec. 4, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRNews File.
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premium growth and risk diversity, have made global expansion a
priority. ° The most fertile markets for insurers in their quest to
expand are the profitable, unsaturated markets found in developing
nations. 1
Brazil, which has the largest insurance market in Latin
America, has been an important target for trade negotiators and
insurance companies. 2 As a result of the Real Plan economic
stabilization program introduced by President Cardoso in June
1995, Brazil has experienced an insurance boom. 3 In 1995
Brazil's insurance market grew to $7.5 billion, an increase of
thirty-four percent from the previous year. 14  By 1997 the
insurance market had grown to a total of $17.1 billion.' 5 Despite
this growth, foreign insurance companies consider the Brazilian
insurance market to be a virgin market. 16 Should Brazil liberalize
its reinsurance market, a similar boom in growth will occur. 7
Brazil's reinsurance market is currently valued at almost $800
million, and within a year following a liberalization of the market,
it is predicted to grow to $2 billion. 8 The world's largest
reinsurers have longed to access Brazil's developing insurance
10 See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
12 See Bahree & Cooper, supra note 5; infra notes 46-48, 53-54 and accompanying
text.
13 See Brazil in Insurance Boom, INS. INDUSTRY INT'L, Mar. 1995, at 7.
" See id. The three largest growth areas were automobile (34% of the total),
health (17% of the total), and life insurance (13% of the total). See id.
15 See Insurance Revenues Treble in Brazil, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Aug. 30,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly File.
16 See id.
17 Reinsurance is defined as a contract by which an insurer procures a third person
to insure him against loss or liability by reason of original insurance. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990). Reinsurance is an invaluable tool to insurers as it
permits them to participate in programs that would normally far exceed their own
capacity. See Henry G. Parker, Liberalizing Global Reinsurance, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER-PROP. & CASUALTY, Oct. 20, 1997, at 27, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nuprop File. Reinsurance by definition is the most global of all insurance
practices. See id.
18 See Gavin Souter, Spotlight Report; Reinsurers Primed to Enter an Open
Brazilian Market, Bus. INS., Sept. 2, 1996, at 18, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Busins File.
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market in anticipation of capitalizing on this huge opportunity for
growth.19
For over thirty years, Brazil's insurance market has been
sealed from foreign insurance and reinsurance companies. ° Strict
regulations prohibited any new investments by foreign insurers,
and a government monopoly over reinsurance kept reinsurers away
from Brazil's reinsurance market.21 In the FSA, Brazil finally gave
foreign insurers what they had been seeking-a commitment to
allow foreign insurers to invest freely in the Brazilian insurance
market.22 On the reinsurance side, Brazil indicated it would open
its reinsurance sector in the near future by privatizing its
reinsurance monopoly (Instituto de Resseguros do Brasil -
Reinsurance Institute of Brazil or IRB), thus allowing the "supply
of reinsurance services by private institutions., 23  Although
Brazil's offer was a boost for foreign insurers, its vague
commitment to liberalize its reinsurance market damages
24
reinsurance companies and Brazilian consumers.
A relationship exists between trade barriers and consumer
welfare in insurance. Essentially, insurance is a contract for
payment in the future.25 The fiduciary character of insurance and
19 See John Jennings, Going Global Called Critical to Insurer Growth, NAT.
UNDERWRITER-PROP. & CASUALTY, June 8, 1998, at 35, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nuprop File.
20 See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
21 See id.
22 See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
23 World Trade Organization, Non-Attributable Summary of the Main
Improvements in the New Financial Services Commitments (visited Mar. 31, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/services/finsum.htm> [hereinafter Summary of the Main
Improvements].
24 The structure of Brazil's insurance market can be described as an upside-down
funnel. At the wide end exists a multitude of insurance companies that have no choice
but to place their reinsurance through the IRB monopoly, situated at the top, narrow end
of the funnel. Such a structure indirectly gives Brazilian regulators, via the IRB,
constrictive control over the insurance market. In an open market, a multitude of
reinsurers would exist, fueling competition to the benefit of insurers and consumers.
25 See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. NATIONAL STUDY ON TRADE IN SERVICES,
A SUBMISSION BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON
TARIFFS AND TRADE (1982) [hereinafter U.S. NAT'L STUDY], reprinted in KENNETH J.
MEIER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SERVICES 1009, 1013 (1988).
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its effect on public interest make it a legitimate subject of
regulation and control by the state to guarantee performance.26 As
stated in the official comment to the proposal for the German
Insurance Supervision Law in 1900, "the public interest has an
especially large stake in a prosperous and solid development of the
insurance business, and imposes on the government a duty of
special care in this field."27 Among developing nations, however,
insurance regulations are often established to protect domestic
insurance markets from foreign competition and, thus act as
unreasonable trade barriers.28  Trade-barrier insurance regulations
of this type negatively impact consumers.29
Brazil's strict reinsurance regulations serve as a substantial
barrier to trade and create an isolated marketplace. The
regulations suffocate the development of the insurance industry
and stifle innovations in products, processes, and market
26 See id. at 1010; see also LEE R. Russ & THOMAS F. SEGALL, COUCH ON
INSURANCE 2-3 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing public interest in insurance industry).
Insurance regulation includes any legislation, rule, or order that affects the insurance
industry. See id. at 2-4. Spencer Kimball recommends that objectives of insurance
regulation should be based on internal and external goals. See Spencer L. Kimball, The
Regulation of Insurance, in INSURANCE, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY 3, 5 (Spencer
L. Kimball & Herbert S. Denenberg eds., 1968). Internal goals consist of preservation
and enhancement of insurer solvency, and objectives to ensure fairness, equity, and
reasonableness in the insurance market. See id. Kimball discusses two categories of
external goals relating to general public policy of society. See id. at 5-6. The first is
political objectives that can further be broken into three subcategories: (1) libertarian
objective or freedom of government restraint; (2) avoidance of local protectionism; and
(3) federalism or the dispersion of decision making power in the community. See id. at
6-7. The second is socialization of risk, which includes compulsory or quasi-
compulsory extension of insurance coverage without involving an equitable distribution
of cost on social instead of economic grounds, freedom of entrepreneurs to enter the
insurance market, and objectives related to capital accumulation. See id. at 7-8. The
principle of insurance regulation is that there should be no interference or intervention in
the operation of the economy unless regulators are sure of what it is they are doing. See
id. at 8-9.
27 Werner Pfenningstorf, Public Law of Insurance, in IX INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 7, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS AND
INSTITUTIONS 16 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1991) (quoting the Insurance Supervision Law of
1900). This encyclopedia is printed in German.
28 See Robert Carter, Insurance, in THE URUGUAY ROUND, SERVICES IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY 64 (Patrick A. Messerlin & Karl P. Sauvant eds., 1990).
29 See id.
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efficiency. °  In such a marketplace, consumers become
disempowered and their ability to become risk averse, via
insurance, is diminished.31 Consumers in Brazil have been forced
to purchase insurance in an uncompetitive environment where
products are excessively priced and inadequate as compared to
open market standards. Thus, the Brazilian reinsurance
regulations hurt consumers and fail to meet an important part of
their existence-to promote consumer welfare.
The higher the barriers to trade in insurance, the greater the
harm to consumers. The negative effects of suffocating insurance
regulations on consumers is a facet of liberalizing international
insurance barriers that is often de-emphasized, if not overlooked.
The welfare of insurance consumers in Brazil depends on Brazil's
commitment to remove the barriers to trade in reinsurance entirely
and to open its market to foreign competition. The FSA serves as
an excellent starting point from which to analyze the Brazilian
insurance regulations and its effects on foreign insurance
companies and the Brazilian consumer.
I. Background: An Overview of Trade in Financial Services
For the last seventeen years, developing nations have made
liberalization to trade in services a priority in multilateral
negotiations. In 1982 the United States, a leading advocate for
liberalization to trade in insurance, introduced a proposal to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for negotiations
on trade in services.33 Although the proposal was rejected, the
United States continued to push for multilateral negotiations in the
services area.34 International trade rules finally included trade in
services in the 1986 Uruguay Round of GATT. It was out of this
round in 1993 that the General Agreement on Trade in Services
30 See generally id. at 63.
3" See id.
32 See DOROTHY I. RIDDLE, SERVICE LED GROWTH 204-09 (1986).
33 See id. at 204.
31 See id. at 204-05.
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(GATS)35 was formed, setting global principles and creating a
structure for future negotiating rounds to lower barriers to trade in
services.36
At the 1986 Uruguay Round, new negotiations to trade in
services were planned to begin by January 1, 2000 with the goal of
reaching greater liberalization.37 In 1995, however, negotiations
were reopened because of concerns, mostly raised by the United
States, about the shortage of commitments to liberalization by
other countries.38
Out of these negotiations arose the 1995 Accord, a provisional
agreement whereby WTO members agreed to implement their
"best offers" to reduce barriers in financial services. 9 The 1995
Accord extended original negotiations to resume formally on April
1997, with a positive result anticipated by December 1997.40 The
United States prematurely reopened negotiations, however, with
the intention of arriving at a multilateral agreement for freer trade
in financial services-not an agreement to agree in the future.4'
The last minute decision by the United States to withdraw its 1995
Accord offer of keeping its financial markets open to WTO
members effectively destroyed any possibility of reaching a
35 See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1168
(1994) [hereinafter GATS].
36 See Jeffrey Sismer, GATS and Financial Service: Redefining Borders, 3 BUFF.
J. INT'L L. 33, 65 (1996). GATS was created as one of several annexes to the agreement
creating the WTO. See id. at 47. GATS consists of three tiers: (1) basic commitments
and rules of application; (2) annexes, protocols and ministerial decisions; and (3)
schedule of reservations. See id.
31 See SCHOTT, supra note 2, at 7.
38 See id. at 13.
39 Second Protocol to the General Agreement on Trade in Services & Related
Decisions, S/L/ 1 (95-2165) (July 24, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 199, 199-205
(1996). Parties to the agreement include Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Czech
Republic, Egypt, European Union, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Singapore,
the Slovak Republic, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. See
id; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE
RELATIONS TASK FORCE, FALL NATIONAL MEETING 896 (1995).
40 See Charles Owen Verrill, Jr., et al., International Trade, 32 INT'L LAW. 319,
319 (1998).
41 See id.
1999]
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42
multilateral agreement in financial services.
Although the U.S. position to withdraw from the 1995 Accord,
and thereby scuttle negotiations, was extreme, the United States
did not act alone in pushing for equal agreement terms.43 Since the
end of the GATT Tokyo Round, other industrial countries have
joined the United States in increasing their demands for reciprocity
in trade negotiations, particularly to developing nations.44  The
demands by developed countries for reciprocity have not been
without reason. A national study on trade in services shows that
the countries most active in erecting barriers to trade in services
have been the least developed countries.45
Brazil, considered a "hard liner" and one that was opposed to
including services under GATT, was a major target of developed
countries seeking reciprocity in trade negot 46coutris ci o  xdenegotiations. In the
Uruguay Round, Brazil was asked to match trade concessions
offered by other WTO parties.' Brazil looked at many of the
concessions as "zero-sum games" in which benefits for developed
countries would result in losses for Brazil .
42 See Aviva Freudman & John Zarocostas, WTO Financial Accord in Sight,
Despite Snags, J. CoM., Dec. 11, 1997, at IA. To avoid a walkout in the 1997
negotiations, representatives of the financial services industries in developed nations
established a forum called the Financial Leader Group. See id. Since 1995, the Group
has met over a one and a half year period to agree on the level of liberalization and to
make their views known to national negotiators. See id.
41 See generally CARLO ALBERTO PRIMO BRAGA, THE URUGUAY ROUND, SERVICES
IN THE WORLD ECONOMY BRAZIL 197 (1990). The decision by the United States to
withdraw from the 1995 negotiations was based on the position that efforts toward
liberalization were moving too slowly and that not enough liberalization had occurred to
guarantee that it would keep its own market open to other countries on a
nondiscriminatory basis. See Verrill, supra note 40, at 319-20. The United States made
its stance clear to the WTO countries that were slowing their liberalization programs
without breaking their commitments: either improve offers to liberalize barriers to trade
or the United States will close its financial markets. See id.
4 See Verrill, supra note 40, at 319-20.
41 See Berg, supra note 6, at 9.
46 Id. According to the U.S. National Study on Trade in Services, in 1984 Brazil
had the most impediments to trade in services with 33 listed barriers. See id.; see also
BRAGA, supra note 43, at 197 (noting Brazil's resistance to negotiations resulting in
multilateral liberalization of trade in services).
I See BRAGA, supra note 43, at 197.
48 Id. During the Uruguay Round, Brazil also argued that "trade liberalization was
[Vol. 24
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Brazil's prior resistance to negotiations in trade in services has
both ideological and practical roots.49 From an ideological angle,
Brazil refused to accept the rule of "static comparative advantage"
under free trade.5° Pragmatically, Brazil harbored unwarranted
concerns about foreign direct investment in services on the
assumption that free trade in services was equivalent to laissez-
faire.51 In the Uruguay Round, Brazil made the point that its
economy would be better off using regulatory instruments other
than restrictions on foreign capital investment in services.52 This
argument supported the maintenance of Brazil's strict and
complicated insurance regulations.
The insurance industry has played an active role in supporting
financial service negotiations and has called for trade rules for
services since 1973." Insurance companies in developed nations
have a strong desire to expand their businesses into new global
markets in response to consolidation of the industry and increased
competition at home.54
In recent years, the insurance markets in the United States and
other developed nations have experienced sluggish growth.55 In
1996 insurance premium income in North America posted a
growth rate of only 1.3% from 1995, and Western Europe
similarly posted a low 5% annual growth rate in 1996.56 By
comparison, worldwide insurance premiums have grown
dramatically in recent years. In 1981 total worldwide insurance
not an end in itself but a possible means of promoting economic development..., the
whole negotiating process should be informed by this ultimate goal and that developing
countries should be granted special and differential treatment." Id.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
13 See Gavin Souter, WTO Pact Includes Insurance, Bus. INS., Dec. 22, 1997, at 2.
14 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.,
55 See P.T. Bangsberg, Worldwide Premium Income Slips, J. COM., June 26, 1998,
at 5A; John Zarocostas, Global Premium Income Slows Industry: Survey Finds 3.5
Percent Rise in 1994, vs. An Increase of 6 Percent in the Previous Year, J. COM., June
24, 1996, at IA.
56 See id.
1999]
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premiums exceeded $450 billion. 7 By 1996 the total had reached
$2.106 trillion with much of the recent growth in developing
nations. 8
Despite annual growth in the world insurance market that far
exceeds the pace of global economic development since the 1950s,
trade in insurance has increasingly been subject to trade barriers
erected mostly by developing nations. 9, The main reason for the
developing nations' resistance to liberalization in trade in
insurance is the misunderstanding of the role and importance of
insurance in economic development.6 Insurance regulators in
emerging markets fear that investments by foreign insurance
companies will take power away from them and put it into the
hands of foreign investors." This argument becomes increasingly
weak as the developing nations begin to realize that foreign
investment by insurance companies is critical to economic
growth.62
Insurance is essential to economic development because it
facilitates trade and commerce and mobilizes savings.63  Banks
readily lend money when they can insure against risk. Also,
insurance can act as a substitute for government security programs,
thereby freeing precious capital for use in other sectors. Overall,
developing economies gain from eliminating barriers to trade in
financial services: less expensive capital and financial products
spur economic growth.66
Negotiators from developed nations that have a distinct
17 See Bangsberg, supra note 55, at 5A.
58 See Zaracostas, supra note 55, at IA.
59 See CARTER, supra note 28, at 66.
o See Helen R. MacLeod, Follower or Leader: WTO Debates Insurers' Role in
Emerging Nations, J. CoM., Oct. 2, 1997, at IA [hereinafter Follower or Leader].
61 See Janet E. Belkin & Jerry Warshaw, Familiarity Doesn't Always Breed
Contentment: Entering Foreign Insurance Markets, BEST'S REv., Nov. 1996, at 20.
62 See Follower or Leader, supra note 60 at IA.
63 See id.
4 See id.
65 See id.
66 See Double Trouble: Trade in Financial Services, ECONOMIST, June 17, 1995,
at 79.
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comparative advantage in insurance made trade in insurance a
priority in the 1997 financial service negotiations." Difficulties in
reaching agreements in the insurance area, however, nearly caused
the breakdown of services negotiations.
Specifically, Malaysia's' refusal to grant foreign insurance
corporations more than a fifty-one percent ownership of its
insurance companies required adjustments to the final agreement. 68
India's failure to propose improvements in insurance weighed
negatively on its offer.69 Japan nearly halted negotiations from the
outset by refusing to give multilateral status to the bilateral U.S.-
Japan agreement on insurance.7°  Only Japan's eventual
willingness to extend thel terms of this agreement to its offer
allowed a final deal.71 It was Brazil's positive last minute offer in
the financial services agreement that kept the negotiations afloat.
Brazil's offer placed considerable pressure on other emerging
nations to come up with similar offers or risk derailing the WTO
negotiations. Brazil's crucial role in the financial service
negotiations proved to be a major benefit to the global insurance
industry.
Prior to the WTO negotiations, Brazil maintained strict barriers
to trade in insurance.73 Since 1966 new foreign insurance
67 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text. Trade in services represents a
significant portion of the U.S. economy. For example, in 1985 70% of available
employment in the United States came from the services sector. See Kenneth A. Votre,
Trade in Services: Proposals for the Liberalization of International Trade in Insurance,
13 BRGPT. L. REV. 537, 539 (1993). In addition, this sector accounted for 70% of the
U.S. gross domestic product. See id.
68 See Last Minute Push Yields WTO Financial Services Pact, JEI REP., Dec. 19,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File. The insurance lobby claimed that
the WTO's ability to reach a financial services agreement "was in large part thanks to
the close cooperation over the last eighteen months between European insurers ... and
those in the U.S." European Insurers' Stress Their Role in WTO Financial Services
Deal, EuR. REP., Jan. 10, 1998, available at 1998 WL 879936 [hereinafter European
Insurers].
69 See European Insurers, supra note 68.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See John Zarocostas, Brazil's Offer Raises Pressure on Asia in Finance Service
Talks, J. COM., Dec. 9, 1997, at 3A.
71 See Raymond D. Hill, Brazil: The Insurance Market Consolidation of the
1999l
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companies were not allowed to transact business in Brazil except
for minority partnerships in joint ventures.74  Also, foreign
insurance companies were not permitted to repatriate more than
twelve percent of their profits." Moreover, companies owned by
the Brazilian government were required to place their business
with one hundred percent Brazilian owned insurance companies.76
Brazil pleased the WTO trade negotiators and foreign
insurance companies by agreeing to allow the establishment of
new branches and subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies,
along with increases in the percentage of foreign participation in
Brazilian insurance institutions.77  Brazil suggested that future
regulations would "permit the supply of reinsurance services by
private institutions," and that "commitments regarding commercial
presence in reinsurance would be undertaken within two years
after the adoption of relevant legislation. 78
The motivation behind Brazil's positive offer to the WTO was
to attract foreign investment. In 1990 the Brazilian government
initiated a vigorous Privatization Program pursuant to federal
law. 79 The program was implemented out of a desire to attract
foreign capital to finance a growing trade deficit and to draw
technology to modernize Brazil's infrastructure. 0 As a result of
1970s, in THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 212, 215-16 (Bernard
Wasow & Raymond D. Hill eds., 1986).
14 See id.
71 See id.
76 See id. Prior to the WTO negotiations, in 1996, the Brazilian federal
government attorney's office (Procuradoria Geral da Uniao) issued a statement to the
effect that insurance companies were not considered financial institutions. See Foreign
Competition, Deregulation, Shape a New Market in Brazil, LAGNIAPPE LETTER, Nov. 8,
1996, available at 1996 WL 8394944. Therefore, foreign insurance companies could
enter the market without awaiting further legislation. Although foreign insurance
companies then began investing in Brazil's insurance market, they did so with
reservations because of the lack of definition of the new rules. See id.
7" See Summary of the Main Improvements, supra note 23.
78 Id.
71 See Jose Luis De Salles Freire, Privatization in Brazil, Paper Presented at the
SBL 1 lth & SGB 7th Biennial Conference (Oct. 1993). The privatization program was
instituted by Federal Law No. 8,031 of April 12, 1990. See id.
'0 See Let the Party Begin: Brazil's Privatization Program Is as Complex as It Is
Gigantic but It Promises Huge Rewards to Foreign Investors-and a Chance to Change
the Way Everybody Does Business in Latin America's Biggest Country, ECONOMIST,
[Vol. 24
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the privatization program, foreign insurers invested over $1 billion
in Brazil between 1994 and 1998."8 Brazilian insurance
companies, not consumers, have been the primary benefactors
from this substantial foreign investment.
Brazil's removal of entry restrictiois Satisfies insurers. Its
vacuous commitment to liberalize its reinsurance regulations,
however, allows a substantial barrier to trade in insurance to
remain. Thus, to the detriment of the Brazilian consumer, the
formation of an open, competitive insurance market is prevented.
III. The Brazilian Reinsurance System-Instituto de
Resseguros do Brasil (IRB)
A. Overview of Brazil's Insurance System
In the late 1960s, Brazil made an effort to support its insurance
market by increasing profitability and growth.82 Brazil hoped to
increase the retention by local insurance companies and therefore
reduce the need to obtain reinsurance from foreign insurance
companies.83 It also sought to generate capital for national
investment growth.4
In 1966 the Brazilian government began to consolidate the
insurance industry and tighten control through the regulatory
authorities. 5 Starting in the late 1960s, the government forced
mergers of insurance companies, reducing the number in Brazil
from 189 to 93 by 1978.6 On November 21, 1966, the
government passed Decree Code No. 73, establishing the Private
Apr. 26, 1997, at 57 [hereinafter Let the Party Begin].
81 See Corporate Finance, BRAZ. WATCH, Mar. 24-Apr. 7, 1997, at 9. In February
1997 the U.S. insurance company Aetna purchased a 49% interest in Sul America for
$425 million. See id. Eight months later another U.S. insurance giant AIG partnered
with Unibanco and invested approximately $500 million. See AIG Makes Highest
Investment in October, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Oct. 16, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File. Recently, five other direct insurers have invested in
Brazil at a conservative estimate of $167.5 million. See Corporate Finance, BRAZ.
WATCH, Mar. 24-Apr. 7, 1997, at 9.
82 See Hill, supra note 73, at 218.
83 See id.
'4 See id. at 218-19.
85 See id. at 215.
86 See id.
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Insurance National System (SNSP), comprised of the National
Private Insurance Council (CNSP), the IRB, and the Private
Insurance Superintendency (SUSEP).87 Included in the basic
legislation was Act No. 1186 of April 3, 1939, which created the
IRB.88
The IRB has the greatest effect on the insurance market and
consumers in Brazil. The IRB maintains a strict legal monopoly
with respect to the underwriting of reinsurance, giving the
government effective control over foreign transactions in
insurance." In furtherance of its function "to promote the full
utilization of the capacity of the national insurance market," no
consumer can purchase direct insurance abroad without the
consent of the IRB. 90 Also, all insurance companies must reinsure
with the IRB. 9' The IRB retrocedes a proportion of reinsurance
cessions around the Brazilian insurance market and acts as the
market's retrocedent abroad. 9 Although it is the responsibility of
the CNSP to define insurance policies, in reality, the CNSP must
receive the IRB's consent since it is the IRB that arranges the
reinsurance to underwrite the policy.93 In essence, the IRB's
87 See Trade Policy Review, Brazil, at 162, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/21 (1996)
[hereinafter Trade Policy Review, Brazil]. Decree Code No. 73 is governed by Decree
Code No. 60459 of March 13, 1967. See id. at 162. This regulation was issued by
agencies with the Brazilian Private Insurance System, and the Brazilian civil and
commercial codes. See id.
The CNSP's responsibilities include "defining policies for private insurance and
reinsurance as well as regulating the establishment, organization, operation and
supervision of entities undertaking activities within the SNSP." Id. SUSEP is
responsible for implementing CNSP defined policies and "set[ting] guidelines and
general principles for private insurance." Insurance Legislation and Supervision in
Developing Countries, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, at 85, tbl. 1, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/393 (1972) [hereinafter Insurance Legislation].
88 See Insurance Legislation, supra note 87, at 68. The Brazilian Constitution
established that supplementary law would create an official agency that would regulate
the Brazilian financial system. See PINHEIRO NETO-ADVOGADOS, DOING BusINESS IN
BRAZIL 4 (1996).
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 See id.
92 See id.
9' See id.
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monopoly control over reinsurance controls the entire Brazilian
insurance market.
B. Financial Performance of the IRB
The success of Brazil's plan to bolster its insurance market and
the effects of the IRB on consumer welfare can be analyzed in part
by looking at the financial performance of the IRB. For most of
its history, the IRB has operated at a profit. Today the IRB,
known as IRB Brasil Re, "requires an injection of $250 million in
capital. 94  Over the years the IRB has made major errors
concerning the financial management of its assets, operations
overseas, and basic underwriting practices. In 1992 its President,
Luis Quattroni, was forced to resign over a financial scandal
involving an alleged irregular payment of $500,000 to debt
auditors in France.95 This incident is minor, however, compared to
the-IRB's neglect of basic rules of financial management, such as
diversification of risk.96
On August 1, 1997, the Finance Minister made public a
detailed report, conducted over an eight month period on the
administration of the IRB during the last few decades. 97 The report
concluded that the IRB had "frittered away public money and
assets."98 The report also concluded that the IRB lost $2.7 billion
in equity from 1992 to 1997.99 The equity of the IRB in 1997 was
$299 million, but it could have been $2.9 billion if the IRB had
been treated in a "healthy way.
' °00
The report also found that IRB's financial director, Ivan
Lagrotta, was granted unlimited autonomy by the IRB president,
9' IRB Needs $250 Million in Capital, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Aug. 4, 1997,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly File.
95 See IRB, WORLD CORP. INS. REP. (FIN. TIMES, London), May 22, 1992, at 1.
96 See IRB Breaks Basic Financial Management Rules, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV.
NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
97 See IRB Report Indicates Equity Losses of R$4.5 Billion, GAZETA MERCANTIL
INV. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
98 id.
9' See id.
1"0 Id. The U.S. dollar figures have been converted from Real, the Brazilian
currency, at an exchange rate of .5970. See Exchange Rates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
1999, at C22.
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contrary to Article 15 of the IRB statute.'0 ' As a result, financial
decisions were made without the IRB's consideration and were
made poorly.'0 2 As of August 1995, the IRB had invested a total of
$148 million in Banco Econtmico's branches abroad.0 3 This
represented fifty-two percent of the total in time deposits, an
excessive amount to be invested in only one institution.'04
In addition, the IRB has been criticized for mismanagement of
its export credit insurance operations, which resulted in $750
million in underwriting losses to IRB.' 5 The majority of these
losses, however, was the result of Brazil's export incentive policyS 106
between 1976 and 1982 rather than IRB policy. Nevertheless, as
a result of the IRB's mismanagement of investments in the
international market, the IRB posted its first loss of $120 million
in 1994.107
In the 1970s the IRB decided to expand beyond its closed
insurance market and to enter the international reinsurance
marketplace. In 1975 the IRB opened an office in London and in
1978 an office in New York.'08 The IRB offices in London and
New York turned out to be a significant waste of public money.109
After the discontinuation of the underwriting risk operations,
the London office continued to employ 180 people, and thirteen
1o' See IRB Invested Excessively in Banco Econtmico, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV.
NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
102 See id.
103 See id.
'04 See id.
"05 See IRB Export Credit Represents Losses of $750 Million, GAZETA MERCANTIL
INV. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
'0o See id.
107 See IRB Breaks Basic Financial Management Rules, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV.
NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
108 See IRB Office in London Had at One Point 180 Employees, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Aug. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
109 See id. The IRB entered into a real estate deal in New York at a clear loss to the
company. See IRB, WORLD CORP. INS. REP. (FIN. TIMES, London), May 20, 1994, at 1.
IRB rented the New York office for $36,000 per month, for a 10 year period, with a pre-
established annual increase of 20% every six months. See id. IRB also contracted to
pay a $3 million penalty in the event that the rental contract was broken, despite the fact
that the whole building was valued at only $6 million. See id.
[Vol. 24
BRAZILIAN REINSURANCE SYSTEM
years later recorded office costs of $2.2 million. " °  Most
importantly, due to poor underwriting practices, the IRB lost a
combined $800 million from the London and New York
operations between 1987 and 1997.111 The IRB's results in
London and New York illustrate that the IRB, in its present
structure, can only operate within its own borders protected by a
strict environment without competition.
Recently, the IRB has begun to improve its condition. As a
result of its restructuring process, which was initiated in June
1997, the IRB became a corporation."' The IRB reduced its work
force from 1800 to 500, cut costs, and pursued new market
niches. "3 Since the August 1, 1997 report by the Brazilian Finance
Minister, the IRB's results have improved. In the first half of
1998 the IRB registered a net profit of $48 million, an increase of
sixty-seven percent from the previous year.114  Additionally, in
June 1998, after not paying a dividend for three years, the IRB
paid its shareholders approximately $10 million. "5 Although the
IRB's recent results are encouraging, there is no guarantee that a
change in government policy or regime will not result in the IRB's
digression, leading it to again become a grossly inefficient and
mismanaged government entity. As long as the IRB remains a
non-private entity shielded from competitive market forces, the
risk remains that the IRB will return to a state of inefficiency and
mismanagement.
C. Efforts to Privatize the IRB
On August 1, 1996, the House of Representatives and the
Brazilian Senate approved Constitutional Amendment No. 13,
bringing an end to the IRB monopoly for reinsurance activities in
110 See id.
"' See IRB Loses $800 Million on Foreign Operations, GAZETA MERCANTIL
ONLINE, Aug. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly File.
112 See IRB Posts First Half Net Profit of R$80.6 Million, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV.
NEWS, Aug. 6, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
113 See id.
14 See id.; supra note 100.
15 See Reinsurance Institute Pays R$17 Million in Dividends, GAZETA MERCANTIL
ONLINE, June 8, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly File; supra note 100.
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Brazil. 16 The amendment, however, which was promulgated by
the President of the Senate, Jose Samey, still requires enabling
legislation and regulations that have yet to be drawn and may take
a long time to develop."7
In addition, the anticipated date for privatization has been
pushed further into the future."' On November 27, 1997, Lidio
Duarte, Director of SUSEP, stated that the IRB will be privatized
in 1998."' Soon after, Paulo Oscar Franca, Vice President of the
IRB, claimed that the IRB would be fully privatized before the
first half of 1999.20 Then on December 9, 1997, Marcos
Caramuru De Paiva, Brazil's chief negotiator at the WTO talks,
issued a statement that the IRB would be privatized by the year
2000.'
2
'
The privatization of the IRB is not a recent topic. In 1989 the
superintendent of SUSEP issued a proposal under the framework
of Article 192122 of the 1988 Constitution' 23 to end the IRB's
116 See BRAZ. CONST., reprinted in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD 166-67 (Albert D. Blaustein & Hisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996), also available at
Bayerische Julius-Maximilians-Universitat Wurzburg, Brazil Index (visited Apr. 4,
1999) <http:\\www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/br _indx.html>; NETO-ADVOGADOS, supra
note 88, at 4. The proposed amendment also includes regulations for the authorization
and operation of insurance establishments, capitalization, and private pension schemes.
See Trade Policy Review, Brazil, supra note 87, at 163. The rules would cover the
official supervisory agency (SUSEP) and may establish an indemnification fund to
protect insured parties against the liquidation of insurers. See id.
117 See Reinsurance Monopoly End Promulgated, WORLD CORP. INS. REP. (FIN.
TIMES, London), Sept. 6, 1996, at 1; see also Work Group Proposed IRB Restructuring
to Malan, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, May 5, 1997, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Gazinv File [hereinafter Work Group] (noting that approval of necessary
regulations "will take some time").
'18 See Work Group, supra note 117.
119 See SUSEP Director Expects IRB to Be Privatized in 1998, GAZETA MERCANTIL
INV. NEWS, Nov. 27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
120 See IRB to Be Privatized by First Half of 1999, Says Franca, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Nov. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
121 See John Zaracostas, Brazil's Offer Raises Pressure on Asia in Finance Service
Talks, J. COM., Dec. 9, 1997, at 3.
122 Article 192 contains rules for insurance.
123 The Constituicao Federal (Federal Constitution or C.F.), the supreme law of
Brazil, was amended and published on October 5, 1988. See supra note 116.
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monopoly of domestic reinsurance. 124 Under the SUSEP proposal,
the IRB would become a non-monopolistic reinsurer, and SUSEP
would supervise and control the reinsurance area in the same way
it regulates insurance companies." The opposition to SUSEP's
plan, however, was strong and came from both the IRB and large
domestic insurance companies.
The IRB argued that the end to the monopoly would bring with
it the danger of oligopoly'26 and that small insurers would
disappear.'27  The IRB president also stated that "the 1988
Constitution admits the central role of an official insurer without
mentioning competition with the private sector, and that the
central determination of policy by IRB enables the maximum
retention of domestic capacity.,,12' Brazil's largest private
domestic insurance company, Bradesco Seguros SA, supported the
IRB's position, and ultimately the SUSEP proposal was
withdrawn." 9
Recently, the Brazilian government has made efforts, which
appear to be more concrete than in the past, to privatize the IRB.
On June 18, 1997, President Cardoso announced Provisional
Measure 1,578.130 This Provisional Measure determined a new
124 See IRB's Future Debated, WORLD CORP. INS. REP. (FIN. TIMES, London), Apr.
28, 1989, at 1. The SUSEP proposal also made suggestions for the opening of the
market to new companies by abolishing the carta patente system, a ban on the
establishment of further insurance companies owned by individual states; an end of the
sorteio lottery for the insurance of government and municipal property, and its
replacement by a tender system; conversion of IRB into a mixed state and privately
capitalized company; compulsory independent auditing of insurers; creation of
mechanisms to ensure customer oriented service; a credit guarantee fund; a company
solvency guarantee fund; and a Conselho Federal de Corretera as a self-regulatory body
for brokers. See id.
125 See Brazil: Market Split on Constitution Proposals, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1989,
at 1.
126 Oligopoly is defined as a market situation in which each of a few producers
affects but does not control the market. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 822 (9th ed. 1986). This argument is ironic since the IRB, as a monopoly,
already affects and controls the market.
127 See IRB's Future Debated, supra note 124.
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See Provisional Measures Alters Share Holding Control of IRB, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, June 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File
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share holding composition of the IRB, making it a mixed capital
company owned fifty percent by private insurance firms and fifty
percent by the government with the state holding all voting
shares. 3' In addition, the IRB's shares, which belonged to the
National Social Security- Institute, were transferred to the federal
government. 112  A new administrative council was formed,
resulting in the IRB sharing management responsibilities with the
federal government and ultimately being presided over by the
executive secretary of the Finance Ministry.'33 Initially, the
National Privatization Program (PND) excluded the IRB from
privatization as an activity considered within the exclusive
competence of the state. 3 4  On December 1997, however, a
commitment was made to include the IRB into the PND.'35 On
March 26, 1999, the National Development Bank announced that
the IRB will be privatized by the end of the summer. 36 Although
rules governing the IRB and reinsurance have not been drafted, it
is expected that forty percent of the reinsurance market will be
reserved for the privatized IRB. ' Therefore reinsurers will still be
obliged to cede reinsurance policies before they can obtain their
own reinsurance. 3 Thus under this plan, even though the IRB
will no longer be government-operated, reinsurers will still be
forced to participate in a government-arranged reinsurance market
and will not have complete free access to the global reinsurance
market. 39 President Cardoso has a strong interest in privatizing
[hereinafter Provisional Measures].
'"' See Souter, supra note 18, at 18. Although the IRB's structure includes 50%
private capital, it remains a monopoly; the IRB is the sole power in conducting
reinsurance, and no competition exists. For an accurate definition of a monopoly, see
BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (3d ed. 1969).
132 See Provisional Measures, supra note 130.
133 See Alterations to IRB Will Result in More Competition, GAZETA MERCANTIL
INV. NEWS, June 18, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
13' See Decree Includes IRB and Datamec in Privatization Program, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Dec. 17, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
135 See id.
136 See Maria Kielmas, Brazil to Sell State Reinsurer, Bus. INS., Apr. 12, 1999, at
113, available in LEXIS, News Library, Busins File.
117 See id.
138 See id.
"9 See id.
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the IRB, but as in the past, a strong resistance to privatization
efforts continues.
A strong local interest remains in at least having a slow
privatization of the.IRB. During the swearing-in ceremony of the
new management of the IRB on November 11, 1997, the Finance
Minister, Pedro Malan, said that opening of the market would be
gradual and cautious. 140 The recent announcement of the sale of
the IRB was a condition of the letter of intent by the Brazilian
government with the International Monetary Fund that was signed
in November 1989 and provided Brazil with a $41 billion
emergency credit line.1 4' However, as of February 1999, fifty-two
countries had ratified the 1997 FSA.12  Brazil was one of the
eighteen countries that had not ratified the FSA and has been given
until June 15, 1999 to do SO.14'3 Brazil has informed the WTO that
it could take an additional ten months to arrange its domestic laws
so that Brazil can ratify the FSA.' 44 Moreover, in Brazil's offer to
the FSA, it states that "commitments regarding commercial
presence in reinsurance would be untaken within two years after
the adoption of relevant [domestic] legislation."' 145  In reality,
changes in the reinsurance monopoly cannot happen until
regulations are drafted which will establish rules for a new
reinsurance system. Regulations, which serve to protect both
primary insurers and consumers from unstable carriers, are
typically complex and will, as a result, be promulgated with
caution. 146
Furthermore, domestic insurance companies in Brazil have a
140 See id.
141 See Kielmas, supra note 136.
142 See John Zarocostas, WTO Will Lower Barriers March 1, J. CoM., Feb. 18,
1999, at 8A.
141 See id.
'44 See id.
"I Summary of the Main Improvements, supra note 23.
146 In July 1998 the Brazilian Development Bank announced that Ernst &
Young/Maxima Corretora and Associacao IRB Brasil consortiums were chosen to
perform the economic-financial evaluations, which include evaluating of the IRB as well
as providing suggestions of a package of rules for the opening of the reinsurance market.
See Consortia Defined to Evaluate IRB Brasil, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, July 29,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly File.
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great interest in slowing privatization efforts. Their motivation
springs from their need to improve operations in order to become
more competitive.14 Local insurance companies may also be
motivated in slowing privatization efforts by their interest in an
opportunity to own a portion of the IRB and their desire to
continue profiting from the artificially high prices created by the
monopoly reinsurance system. The IRB itself suffers a
comparative disadvantage in international competition and, as a
result, will naturally resist privatization until it is competitive.
148
The recent change in the IRB administrative councils, the
Brazilian government's selection of firms for regulatory proposals
and announced sale are encouraging signs. No actual market-
opening changes have occurred, however, and it is unlikely that
privatization will occur in the near future. Yet, as a result of
substantial foreign investments, rapid changes have occurred
within the Brazilian primary insurance market and among
Brazilian consumers. Consequently, an odd situation has formed,
and a tremendous market-friction has been generated. The
Brazilian government is making slow progress in reforming the
IRB regulations, but demand for improved, sophisticated insurance
products by insurance companies and consumers is reaching a
peak.
IV. Consumers of Insurance
A. Approaches to Purchasing Insurance
To understand the effects of the IRB on consumers, a survey
must be made of the approaches taken by large consumers when
purchasing insurance. Large corporations operating in open
insurance markets have become extremely sophisticated in
arranging insurance to protect their assets and business exposures.
The most effective and typical approach taken by large companies
to protect their operations in different locations is to purchase
insurance on a "program basis" using one lead insurance company.
The best suited insurance company for such insurance programs is
one that has an extensive network of offices so that insurance
147 See IRB, WORLD CORP. INS. REP. (FIN. TIMES, London), Jan. 27, 1995, at 1.
148 See CARTER, supra note 28, at 66.
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policies and services can be provided directly to each operation.
To support multinational corporations, an insurance company must
have extensive offices around the world for the same reasons.
The benefits to buying insurance on a program basis, or in
bulk, are that companies can negotiate their insurance premium
with one lead insurance source and, therefore, achieve significant
savings and leverage through economies of scale. This approach
also provides for easy management. Companies can negotiate the
terms and conditions of their entire insurance scheme from their
home office. Furthermore, they can easily affect the design and
quality of insurance for each operation.
Also, large companies usually employ the services of
insurance brokers. 149 Insurance brokers represent the interests of
buyers and are considered experts in reducing or financing a
company's risks and improving "risk management" practices. 5 °
Besides providing additional services such as loss control, brokers
have a high degree of knowledge and, if large enough, leverage in
the insurance marketplace. 5' Insurance brokers stimulate market
efficiency and promote consumer interests. 52  Similarly, large
companies will place their insurance business by broker or by
broker specialty to achieve economies of scale and efficiency.
In recent years, large companies have turned to the alternative
insurance market largely as a means of reducing cost.'53 The
alternative market includes captives, private retentions, qualified
self insurance, risk retention groups, and self insurance pools and
trusts.' 4 Most commonly, large companies retain a large portion of
149 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE BROKERS, MODEL INSURANCE
BROKER LAW pmbl. (1996).
Io See id. Insurance brokers are just as eager to do business overseas as insurance
companies and have developed the Model Insurance Broker Law in an attempt to aid
foreign countries in establishing or modifying existing law as it pertains to insurance
brokers. See id.
151 See id.
152 See id.
'53 See John Covaleski, Alternative Markets: Attracting Wider Following, 96
BEST'S REV., Feb. 1996, at 34.
154 See id. For an in depth discussion and analysis of the alternative market and its
use by insurance buyers, see Ruth Gastel, Captive and Other Risk-Funding Options, INS.
INFO. INST.: INS. ISSUES UPDATE, June 1997, at 1.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
their insurance exposure and finance this risk by incorporating a
captive insurance subsidiary. " ' For tax reasons, most captives are
domiciled in Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Ireland, and more
recently Panama. 56 In the United States, the alternative market
itself has grown from. $66 billion in 1990 to $285 billion in
1999,15' and the use of captives worldwide has grown from 3,029
in 1994 to 4,000 in 1997.158 An integral part of the alternative
market approach is the ability to move cash from a division
receiving protection to its captive subsidiary domiciled in another
country. This cash flow process is often hampered, if not
completely blocked, in restrictive insurance environments.
B. Brazilian Consumers of Insurance
Demand for modern, competitive insurance products in Brazil
has increased in relation to the number of foreign multinationals
investing in Brazil and the speed at which the Brazilian
government continues to privatize large state companies.159 Both
types of entities, as a result of their size, complexity of operations,
and competitiveness, require a sophisticated approach to covering
their business risks. In many respects the need for sufficient
insurance products and services has outpaced what local insurance
companies and the IRB have been able to offer.
In a survey conducted by Price Waterhouse LLP in New York,
ninety percent of sampled executives from major U.S.
multinational companies announced plans to invest in either Brazil
or Argentina within the next three years.' 6° The companies based
155 See Gastel, supra note 154.
156 See id. Panama is the first Spanish speaking captive domicile and is eager to
attract Latin American companies. See Panama Stakes Claim to Captives; New Law
Makes It the First Spanish Speaking Domicile, Bus. INS., Sept. 2, 1996, at 63.
Currently, however, sites of most of the 20 Latin American captives remain in Bermuda.
See id.
157 See Alternative Market Shows a New Face, BEsTWiRE, Feb. 10, 1999, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Bestwr File; Covaleski, supra note 153, at 34.
158 See Captives Hold Their Own in Tough Times, REINSURANCE MAG., Feb. 3,
1999, at 34; 1996 Captive Insurance Report, Bus. INS., Apr. 22, 1996, at 3.
"' See High-Risk Insurance Market Grows, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Mar.
18, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
16 See Paula L. Green, South America Eyed by U.S. Execs, J. COM. Apr. 2, 1997, at
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their decision to invest in Brazil on the Brazilian government's
economic reforms that stabilized chronic inflation, which had
peaked at 2148% a year in 1993, as well as political stability and
liberalization in the regulatory environment."' Brazil's gross
domestic product grew an attractive 4.27% in 1995 and 2.91% in
1996. 162
Net direct foreign investment in Brazil was $10 billion in
1997163 and increased steadily to $18 billion in 1998.164 Between
1996 and 2000 an approximate $10 billion in net direct foreign
investment will be made from automobile manufacturers (Fiat,
Volkswagen, Ford, and GM) alone.'65 Often, investments by large
companies snowball into further investments by smaller
companies. For example, forty automobile suppliers followed
Ford Motor Company's investment in Rio Grande. 166 Given the
current level of growth, Brazil is expected to become the world's
fourth largest manufacturer and fifth largest exporter of
automobiles by the year 2000.167
3A (surveying 70 multinational executives).
161 In an interview Paolo Carega, Managing Director and Region Head Latin
America/Caribbean for J&H Marsh & McLennan, a New York based insurance broker,
said that "the percolating Brazilian economy has made it the most viable country in the
region (Latin America) for foreign investment." Russ Banham, Trend Toward Open
Markets Grows Slowly: Multinationals See Wider Range of Opportunities, J. COM.,
May 7, 1997, at 6A.
162 See Average GDP Growth Over Last 10 Years at 1.89%, GAZETA MERCANTIL
INV. NEWS, Mar. 6, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
163 See Foreign Investment in February Totals $717 Million So Far, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
'64 See Brazil Central Bank's Fraga, AFX NEWS, Mar. 4, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Extafx File.
165 See Economic Summary, BRAZ. WATCH, Mar. 4-18, 1996, at 6.
166 See Charles W. Thurston, Private Sector Tackles the Infrastructure Gap;
Foreign Capital Flows to Fill Pent-Up Demand, J. COM., Nov. 14, 1997, at 5C. Ford
Motor Company predicts that the Brazilian economy could overtake the United
Kingdom and Spain by the year 2000. See Charles W. Thurston, Global Auto Makers
Augment Brazil's Own Investment Effort: Domestic and Export Opportunities Foreseen
as the Nation Grows, J. COM., Aug. 11, 1997, at 4C [hereinafter Global Auto Makers].
167 See Global Auto Makers, supra note 166, at 4C. An automobile manufacturer is
a good example of a type of company that requires a number of diverse insurance
products. As manufacturers of a complex product, they need to make substantial
investment in physical assets such as buildings, machinery and equipment, raw
materials, and warehouses, all of which need to be insured against destruction by various
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The Brazilian government's privatization program has also
increased the number of large companies operating within its
borders. 69 In 1995 President Cardoso accelerated the pace of
Brazil's privatization program with the passage of legislation
allowing for the sale of government electrical, gas, oil, and
telecommunications assets considered too strategic to previously
sell.'69 Between 1991 and 1997, the government sold fifty-five
companies for a total of $15 billion, with many receiving foreign
capital.7 Of particular note was the announcement in April 1997
of the sale of Vale do Rio Doce, a Brazilian mining company
whose mine in Carajas produces a quarter of the world's iron ore
and was estimated at the time to sell for $3 billion.' In April
1998 private investors paid an estimated $7 billion for Brazilian B-
bandwidth cellular phone concessions. 17  In September 1998
Brazil's state phone system, Telebras, was sold for $19 billion and
divided into twelve operating companies.' Once privatized, the
government will operate like a private insurance consumer.
Private insurance consumers are conscious of maintaining market
share and increasing profits and, in turn, place great emphasis on
perils such as fire and lightening. The closing of a plant for even a short period can
result in a substantial loss in sales and profit, which is insured as a business interruption.
Protection against legal liabilities for such risks as pollution and products liability is also
needed, as is protection for workers compensation and benefits not already provided by
the state for employees. The manufacturers will look to export their product to other
nations, thus, requiring inland transit and ocean marine insurance. Other insurance
products that would be considered are political risk, director's and officer's liability,
construction all risk, and fleet automobile.
16 See Hill, supra note 73, at 213. In the 1970s two of Brazil's largest state
companies, Petrobas and Vale do Rio Doce, were on the Fortune 500 list of the largest
corporations outside the United States. See id. The number of Brazilian companies on
the Fortune 500 list increased to five by 1984. See id. In 1996 Companhia Vale do Rio
Doce ranked as Brazil's largest exporter with $1.6 billion and Petrobas ranked fifth with
$693 million. See NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF COMMERCE, SYNTHESIS OF THE
BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 64 (1997).
169 See Charles W. Thurston, Privatization Plan Entering Fast Lane, J. COM., Oct.
30, 1996, at 4D.
170 See Let the Party Begin, supra note 80, at 1.
I"' See Brazil Plans to Move on Sale of Mining Firm, J. COM. Apr. 7, 1997, at liB.
172 See Thierry Ogier, Brazil About To Make Privatization History, J. COM. Apr. 15,
1998, at 3A.
173 See Martyn Warwick, Brazilian Break-Up: Privatization of the Telebras,
COMM. INT'L., Sept. 1998, at 4.
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obtaining suitable, sophisticated insurance schemes to protect their
substantial business risks on the most competitive basis possible.
As state owned entities privatize and multinational
corporations continue to invest in Brazil, the demand for
sophisticated, competitive insurance products will increase. The
success of multinational and recently privatized Brazilian
companies depends on their ability to secure appropriate coverage
for their business risks. Such an escalating and important demand
for sufficient insurance products should force the Brazilian
government to quickly liberalize its reinsurance market.
V. The Unreasonable Brazilian Reinsurance Regulations and
Their Negative Effects on Insurance Consumers
One goal of the Brazilian government in establishing the IRB
was to retain a high percentage of the insurance market's gross
writings, in Brazil and thereby reduce or eliminate its need for
foreign sources for reinsurance. 7 4 A study conducted by Raymond
D. Hill concluded that this consolidation did not adversely affect
consumers.175  It can be argued, however, that because the
Brazilian market was not competitive before monopolization, the
negative effects of monopolization did not make an impact. 1
76
The deliberate action by the Brazilian government to reduce or
eliminate the need for foreign reinsurance has a particularly severe
negative impact on large consumers. When large, sophisticated
consumers cannot obtain suitable coverage for their business risks
through the primary insurance market, they must be able to rely
instead on the participation of international reinsurers to meet their
needs. 177 The IRB's monopoly control over reinsurance eliminates
this option for large consumers. The monopoly reinsurance
system has also created an insurance marketplace where the type
of protection available for consumers is limited. Thus, large
corporations in Brazil are forced to purchase insufficient insurance
through the primary market or self-insure. Such an arrangement
171 See Hill, supra note 73, at 218.
17' See id. at 212-27.
176 See id. at 212, 219.
177 See R.L. CARTER, REINSURANCE 764-65 (1995).
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has a negative effect on consumer productivity as businesses
become less willing to take risks and, in turn, reduce efficient
utilization of resources and economic growth.I17
The negative effects from unreasonable regulations can be
categorized as either direct or indirect. 79 Direct negative effects
result from insurance regulations that control the market, such as
pricing controls. ° Indirect negative effects are the product of
regulations that discriminate against foreign insurance/reinsurance
companies and therefore limit the quality of insurance products
and services available to consumers. 8'
A. Direct Negative Effects on Consumers
Of key importance to any consumer of insurance is the ability
to obtain an insurance program offering the most competitive
terms, conditions, and pricing that a market has to offer. In
particular, large commercial consumers maintain considerable
market leverage through economies of scale. To a significant
degree, the IRB takes away the ability of large consumers to
negotiate the price and type of insurance."
In November 1988 Brazil enacted Decree Law No. 930871, or
Circular 22, abolishing "tariff' rating or direct government
regulation over insurance rates for fire and consequential loss.
1 3
The IRB's sole control over the placement and price of
reinsurance, however, has the same effect as if the government
rates were still in force. Furthermore, the rates set by the IRB are
artificially high and can be as much as two or three times the
normal open market rate on basic risks.
The IRB's inefficiency and lack of competition for reinsurance
increases the cost of reinsurance. Insurers also drive the cost of
reinsurance upward by the IRB's policy of mandatory proportional
178 See id. at 763.
179 See id. at 751-66.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 763-66.
182 See id. at 736.
183 See Brazil: Row Continues Over Fire Tariff Deregulation, FIN. TIMES., Feb. 2,
1988, at 1.
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cessions of all lines of coverage."4 This forces insurers to cede
business that could be retained and for which competitive rates
could be calculated.1
85
Over the years the IRB's strategy, with respect to its
acceptance and cessions of business, has fluctuated. The IRB's
initial policy of ceding more business abroad than it accepted
changed in 1970 to matching acceptances and cessions. 186 In the
late 1970s, the IRB decided to export insurance services with
disastrous results-posting a loss in 1983 of $300 million."7 A
return by the IRB to its two earlier policies will result in an
increase in rates for insurers and consumers. The first two policies
reduce the volume and spread of proportional reinsurance to
foreign reinsurers and require the IRB to purchase, for its own
protection, far in excess of its loss coverage.188 As a result, foreign
reinsurers' portfolios have become less balanced and they must
"load" their rates to the IRB to compensate.
18 9
Although IRB policy prevents a competitive rating system,
consumers are still able to obtain some forms of rate competition,
albeit on a very small scale.'9 A non-exhaustive list of forms of
price competition includes the financing of premiums below
market rates of interest, commission of agents and brokers that can
be restructured through indirect means of payment, and technical
knowledge.' 9' Insurance brokers and agents can ensure that a
consumer receives a minimum rate for a risk by establishing as
many credits as allowed for risks with good protection against
loss.1 92 The last form is a loose interpretation of underwriting
guidelines, allowing a certain risk to be placed in a lower priced
184 See Hill, supra note 73, at 217. The IRB's required cessions are so excessive
they violate sound financial practices. See id.
185 See CARTER, supra note 177, at 763.
186 See Hill, supra note 73, at 224.
187 See id.; see also supra notes 102-25 and accompanying text (discussing the
financial performance of the IRB).
188 See CARTER, supra note 177, at 763.
189 Id.
19 See Hill, supra note 73, at 215.
191 See id. at 216.
192 See id.
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category.1
9 3
The monopoly control over the placement of reinsurance also
prohibits the use of captives by consumers. Therefore, consumers
are unable to offset the high cost of tariff premiums by utilizing
their captives as partial reinsurers in their insurance programs.
Besides creating artificially high rates, the IRB effectively
controls the type of insurance policies made available to insurers
and consumers. Such control over the type of available coverage
eliminates the opportunity for consumers to negotiate, personally
or through brokers, for specialized, tailored coverage to suit their
needs. Instead, only limited "boiler plate" polices 'issued by the
IRB can be obtained.
Against this backdrop of restrictions on pricing and coverage,
Brazil has established strict laws against the use of foreign
reinsurance. 94 The sanctions under Brazilian law for placing
reinsurance outside the IRB are considerable. For any insurance
or reinsurance arranged illegally, the insurer can be fined up to the
limit of the insurance policy. 95
Recently, the IRB has allowed some flexibility by permitting
consumers with extremely large insurance risks to use private,
foreign reinsurance. This is not allowed without IRB participation
or approval and is the exception rather than the rule.' 96 The IRB's
193 See id. Lax interpretation of standards reflects a concept in Brazil known as the
jeito. Jeito is defined as a knack, twist, way, or fix and is employed in bending legal
rules and regulations to reach an expedient result. See Keith S. Rosen, Brazil's Legal
Culture: The Jeito Revisited, 1 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1984). In Brazil jeito is considered
a paralegal institution and is the norm and the formal legal rule the exception. See id. at
3.
194 See Brazil: IRB on Brazil Reinsurance-Still Ours, LLOYD'S INS. INT., Feb. 12,
1996, at 1. In February 1996 the IRB issued a warning to foreign reinsurers that it was
still against the present law to arrange reinsurance without going through the IRB. See
id.
195 See id.
196 Unlike in the past, should a risk exceed the IRB's capacity, the IRB will allow
the participation of foreign reinsurers to meet demand. See Interview with Jeffrey
Wingate, Senior Vice President of Global Services Group at J&H Marsh & McLennan,
in New York, New York (Aug. 1998). For example, recently the IRB approved and was
involved in the development of the program for Usiminas, a major Brazilian steel
manufacturer. See Brazilian Company Using Global Markets, Bus. INS., Nov. 11, 1996,
at 55. The IRB was the lead carrier with a 25% share of the risk. See id. In this case the
required policy limit was a massive $1 billion dollars, far in excess of the IRB's
[Vol. 24
BRAZILIAN REINSURANCE SYSTEM
participation on these programs remains mandatory and raises the
overall program rate above that which would have been obtained
without the IRB's involvement.
Another way for Brazil to ensure that consumers do not freely
access the international insurance market is via the nonadmitted
insurance law that is regulated by Decree Law No. 73.197 This law
requires all insurance to be purchased by a company within its
borders, not via the nonadmitted market, unless it serves a national
interest or is refused by the IRB.' 9'
The outright ban on the use of the nonadmitted insurance
market in Brazil is a way of forcing consumers to purchase the
expensive, limited insurance available in Brazil.199 The solution to
the strict, nonadmitted insurance law in Brazil seems simple. In
Brazil, one should not purchase insurance through the nonadmitted
market but only through local insurance carriers. This solution,
however, is not without problems.
Due to prohibitive insurance premiums, consumers in Brazil
often purchase limited insurance coverage and go without certain
major coverages. Some multinational companies maintain a
streamlined policy in Brazil that will meet local law and make up
the balance of coverage via a nonadmitted "master" policy
purchased in a foreign market. Problems arise, however, when a
loss occurs that is covered only under the nonadmitted "master"
policy. By purchasing the nonadmitted "master" policy, a
underwriting capacity which is estimated at $240 to $250 million. See id. To meet this
demand, foreign reinsurers were involved in the program but only with the IRB's
permission. See id.
197 See Trade Policy Review, supra note 87.
198 See id. The U.S. National Association of Insurance Commissioners defines
nonadmitted insurance as any coverage placed with an insurer not licensed or admitted
to transact business in the state where the risk is located. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, A BACKGROUND STUDY OF THE NON-ADMITTED INSURANCE
MARKET 2 (1980) [hereinafter NAIC].
199 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, PROCLAMATION No.
896 (1995). As a comparison, consumers in the United States can access the
nonadmitted market but must first make an effort to use insurers licensed in the state.
See NAIC, supra note 199, at 2. The United States has established specific "surplus
lines" laws in an attempt to regulate nonadmitted insurance. See id. For nonadmitted
insurance not covered by surplus lines laws, however, U.S. consumers are made aware
that the nonadmitted insurance is exempted from statutory jurisdiction, in whole or in
part by law, or is beyond the jurisdiction of insurance law. See id.
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company violates Brazilian law. Thus, the program carrier will
not pay loss funds to the Brazilian entitythat suffered the loss but
instead will pay to another entity where possible. In this scenario
the company faces the difficulty of having to disguise any funds it
forwards to its Brazilian division as "recapitalization" instead of
insurance proceeds.
The above scenario repeats itself for multinationals, even when
they purchase the broadest possible insurance contract available in
Brazil. Multinationals negotiate international insurance programs
to free market insurance-contract standards, containing terms and
conditions not readily available in Brazil. As a result differences
in coverage are maintained under the nonadmitted "master" policy
that responds to any losses not covered under the restrictive
Brazilian policy. Due to the strict nonadmitted law in Brazil, the
same problems will be faced in the event of a loss that is only
covered under the nonadmitted policy.
Facing a soft international reinsurance market, the IRB
recently reduced its rates by twenty to thirty percent-giving
consumers some relief.200 Theoretically, a rate decrease in the
international reinsurance market would still be curbed by the IRB
since it must account for its own inefficient, expensive operations
before passing any discounts to insurers or consumers. Consumers
would be in a far better position to receive maximum rate
discounts if the Brazilian reinsurance market consisted of multiple
reinsurance companies that must be efficient to survive.2 '
Consumers in Brazil can achieve some rate competition, but it
is minimal in comparison to the gains that can be realized in an
open, competitive insurance market.202 Also, the IRB's policy of
selecting the substantial consumers who can access the
international market is flawed. By accessing the international
insurance market, substantial consumers can obtain better policy
conditions and pricing and greatly improve efficiency.2 3 Yet this
gives substantial consumers an unfair advantage over smaller
200 See Reinsurance Prices Drop Abroad and in Brazil, GAZETA MERCANTIL INV.
NEWS, July 23, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
201 See id.
202 See id.
203 See id.
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consumers who do not have access to an open market.
Ironically, the IRB's process of selective access has resulted in
the IRB poking a hole in its own dam of regulations and could
force the IRB to privatize at an even quicker pace. Companies that
have partially accessed the worldwide market will look to make
their programs even more competitive by eliminating the IRB
from the program altogether. Smaller consumers will have an
even greater desire to access the open market as they become
aware of the benefits enjoyed from the open market and become
pressured to be as efficient as larger competitors.
B. Indirect Negative Effects on Consumers
Before Brazil's commitment in the 1995 Accord, Brazilian
regulations disallowed investments by foreign insurance
companies. 04 In addition, discriminatory measures were placed on
foreign insurance companies already in Brazil. °5
Since Brazil eliminated its thirty-two year restriction, foreign
investment by insurance companies in Brazil has grown at an
explosive rate.206 The influx of insurance companies has eroded
some of the indirect negative effects on consumers in Brazil. The
exclusion of foreign reinsurers from the Brazilian market,
however, severely limits this progress.
Foreign insurance companies faced with intense competition at
home have become extremely efficient and innovative in the
204 See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
205 See U.S. NAT'L STUDY, supra note 25, at 1010-13. According to a U.S.
Department of Commerce study on barriers to trade in insurance, discriminatory
measures placed on foreign insurance companies consist of abusive licensing
procedures, mandatory local incorporation accompanied by national majority ownership
requirements, restrictions on remittances, unfair taxation, exclusion from trade
associations, and restrictions on employment of non-nationals. See id. For a discussion
on barriers to insurance company transactions, see generally John N. Geracimos,
Barriers To International Insurance Transactions: The Search for a Liberalization, 6
J.L. & COM. 489 (1986).
206 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In 1998 three of the ten largest
insurance companies in Brazil were foreign owned, an increase from one in 1994. See
Mario de Almeida, Competition Will be Tougher in Insurance Sector, GAZETA
MERCANTIL INv. NEWS, Oct. 9, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, Gazinv File.
"Further, the foreign capital growth rate between 1996 and 1997 was 245%, compared
to 7% for domestic capital for the same period." Id.
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products they offer consumers. Once allowed to do business in
Brazil, foreign insurance companies will import sophisticated
insurance services, underwriting practices, and modem
management techniques. The benefits of this to Brazilian
consumers can be many including improved quality of services
and diverse products. 7
An example of an important service for large commercial
purchasers of insurance is insurance engineering. Engineering
services allow consumers to analyze their risks of loss and
implement measures to mitigate their business risks. In this
instance insurance companies are more likely to provide a
reduction in premiums and broader insurance policies. In addition
modem underwriting practices stimulate market creativity and
benefit large consumers that have dynamic operations and require
insurance products that meet their changing needs. Foreign
insurance companies have also made substantial investments in
technology, resulting in increased efficiency and accuracy in
transactions with clients and brokers. The importation of modem
management techniques will reduce the cost of doing business
with local insurance companies. Although foreign investment will
greatly benefit local insurance companies by forcing them to
become more efficient, consumers in Brazil remain at a
disadvantage due to the existence of the IRB as a reinsurance
monopoly.
Local insurance companies who have partnered with foreign
insurance companies must purchase their insurance through the
IRB. The IRB's underwriting practices are stale and slow to
207 Examples of the effect of foreign investments increasing the number of products
available to Brazilians are many. The insurance company AIG Life, an arm of AIG,
announced that by the year 2003 it will have 3000 insurance agents throughout Brazil
providing customer service. See AIG Wants to Expand Sales to Other Social Classes,
GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, May 25, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, Gazdly
File. AIG Life is selling its most basic life policy at R$20 a month. See id. American
insurance company Cigna, partnered with Banco Excel, has plans to launch three new
products to Brazilian consumers. See Excel and Cigna Launch Three Insurance Models,
GAZETA MERCANTIL INV. NEWS, Mar. 20, 1997, available at LEXIS, News File, Gazinv
File. Cigna also sells unemployment insurance policies through a popular department
store, Lojas Arapua, for less than R$10. See Arapua Launches Unemployment
Insurance in May, GAZETA MERCANTIL ONLINE, Apr. 27, 1998, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Gazdly File.
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respond to client needs. In addition, their high cost of doing
business will be passed on to the consumers no matter how
efficient the primary insurance company becomes. Hence,
consumers will not receive the full benefits associated with foreign
investment until reinsurance can be purchased in the open,
competitive market.
Recent legislation in Brazil has increased the potential for loss
by consumers and increased the need for an open reinsurance
market. For example, Brazil has enacted laws in the area of
environmental protection that make polluters liable regardless of
knowledge, fault, degree of care, or intent.2°8 This new law has
resulted in a substantial number of cases being brought in
Brazilian courts. °9 With these environmental protection measures,
the potential for consumers to suffer financial loss has increased.
Until the IRB's tight hold on the reinsurance market is liberalized,
any losses suffered by consumers will most likely be underinsured
or uninsured. Unless the regulations controlling the IRB are
reformed, the opening of Brazil's insurance sector to foreign
insurers will result in only a redistribution of the income generated
by the IRB regulations.21°
VI. Conclusion
Free trade in insurance and reinsurance spurs economic
welfare for countries and its consumers. An intimate relationship
exists between liberalizing barriers to trade in insurance and
consumer welfare. When negotiating for liberalizations in
insurance, WTO member states have not always taken into account
the welfare of their insurance consumers but instead have often
acted only in the interests of insurance producers.
Brazil's commitments to the FSA illustrates that liberalizations
of barriers to trade in the primary insurance sector can satisfy the
eagerness of other WTO member states to support their own
primary insurance industry's access to a new market. Gravely
overlooked, however, is that without a corresponding removal of
208 See Ricardo J. Cata, Emerging Markets in Latin America, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REv. 509, 533-34 (1996).
209 See id.
210 See BRAGA, supra note 43, at 197.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
barriers to trade in reinsurance, the positive effects upon Brazilian
consumers of trade liberalizations achieved in the primary
Brazilian insurance sector are significantly diminished.
A fundamental aspect of consumer welfare in insurance is
providing consumers unrestricted, safe access to a competitive
global insurance market. A successful WTO multilateral
agreement will liberalize barriers to trade in insurance and
reinsurance and result in countries acting in concert to establish
fair global regulations over the global insurance market. Such
global regulations would support access to financially sound
insurance and reinsurance carriers operating in the global
insurance market without hindering the international insurance
211
economy.
Presently, Brazilian consumers have no choice but to accept a
delusionary governmental policy that perpetuates the existence of
severe barriers to trade in reinsurance. Brazil's reinsurance
regulations have not kept pace with the country's economic
development. The regulations ignore the global insurance market
and instead deliberately create an. isolated and monopolistic
market. Until liberalizations to barriers in reinsurance are
achieved, Brazilian consumers will operate at a heavy
disadvantage stunting the growth of the Brazilian economy.
211 The YTO is a suitable mechanism for the creation and implementation of such
global insurance regulations. This would mean that monitoring of compliance by
signatories of their commitments could exist. Although the WTO does not have the
force of international law to ensure countries honor their obligations, it would be able to
rule on the conformity of national practices and has an effective dispute settlement
mechanism.
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